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We fully display a cohort model of an economy with an aging population, taking into 
account varying family size, habit formation, inheritance and credit constraints. 
Filling the model with numbers, we are able to compare different pension reforms:  
1. the base run, 2. the reduced accrual rates, 3. replacing wage indexation with price 
indexation and 4. raised retirement age. Whether the policy changes are anticipated 




Keywords: population aging, pension models, pension reforms 
 
 






Nyugdíjreformok egy öregedő társadalomban:  
egy részletes korosztályi modell 




Teljesen bemutatjuk az öregedő népességű gazdaság korosztályi modelljét, amely 
figyelembe veszi a változó méretű családnagyságot, a szokás hatalmát, az örökséget és a 
hitelkorlátokat. A modell számszerűsítésével össze tudjuk hasonlítani a különböző 
nyugdíjreformokat, vagyis 1) az alapfutást; 2) a csökkentett skálaszorzót, 3) a 
bérindexálás helyettesítését árindexálással, 4) a megemelt nyugdíjkorhatárt.   
A magánreakciók nagyon eltérhetnek attól függően, hogy a kormánydöntések hatását 
előrelátják-e vagy sem.   
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There is a growing practical and theoretical interest toward the implication of an aging
population for intergenerational equity, especially concerning pension systems and their
reforms. Since Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987) seminal work, multi-cohort overlapping
models have been used in such investigations. Most of these models are quite complex
and need special software and still leave out important details which may be of interest
to the researcher. In the paper I try to build my own cohort model, which is relatively
easy to program and all the details are given.
The present model has the following characteristics: (a) The aging process is exoge-
nous, is driven by dropping fertility and increasing longevity. As a compromise between
realism and simplicity, we shall work with neither two overlapping generations, nor 100
cohorts but decades. (b) The old-age consumption is largely ¯nanced from a public
pension system with time-variant contribution and accrual rates. (c) The growth rate
of the individual total wage cost is exogenous and time-invariant. (d) The ratio of the
interest factor to the growth factor of the wage bill is time-invariant. (e) The house-
hold's consumption and utility depend on the size of the household. (f) The households
may have various (rational or naive) expectations concerning pension policy. The model
is not calibrated, i.e. it does not reproduce any country's macroindexes. Nevertheless,
I tried to choose the parameter values to represent a typical modern economy.
The model is relatively simple, because its block-structure is reducible: the demogra-
phy block is self-contained, the wage and pension block only depends on the demography
but is independent of the consumption and asset block. The model re°ects the histori-
cally fast transition from a stationary population into a contracting stable population,
occurring between 1950 and 2000. Though the model neglects a number of important
features of such a transition, nevertheless, the results obtained seem to be sensible and
useful.
Having a handy model, we shall compare the following scenarios. First we calibrate
the base run, where only the adjusted contribution rate balances the increasing bur-
den of an aging population. In the second scenario, we assume that the government
drastically reduces the accrual rates, to diminish the contribution rates with respect
to the base run. In the third scenario, wage-indexed pensions are replaced by price-
indexed pensions. Similarly to the previous scenario, the reduction of the indexation
also diminishes the contribution rate. In the fourth scenario, the retirement age is sud-
denly raised, drastically reducing the pension burden. These four scenarios re°ect the
necessary adjustments and the various forms of intergenerational redistribution with
anticipated policy (perfect foresight). Next, rather than assuming that the agents knew
in advance that one key parameter value would be changed, we assume that the change
surprised the agents (naive expectations). Finally, comparing the base run with and
without the complexities, we demonstrate that the complexities are relevant.
Having outlined the results, we turn to a selective survey of the literature. Auerbach
and Kotliko® (1987) invented the approach also followed here: in an overlapping cohort
model with age (year) groups, where the fertility is decreasing, the pay-as-you-go public
pension system interacts with optimizing individuals under a sophisticated system of
perfect foresight. Auerbach, Hagemann, Kotliko® and Nicoletti (1989) extended this
analysis into several directions: varying family size, bequest, open economy and inter-
national comparison. The authors discussed alternative economic policies: a) ¯xing the
1per-capita government expenditure, b) raising the retirement age by two years, c) reduc-
ing the bene¯ts by 20%. The model is so rich that only the neglect of habit formation
and credit constraints can be missed.
Table 0 compares the characteristics of the present model with four other related
ones: + stands for the presence of the property, { stands for its lack.
Table 0. Models and assumptions
Models AHKN BÄ utler Fehr AS AS
Characteristics (1989) (1997) (2000) (2003) (2009)
Decreasing birth rate + { + + +
Increasing life expectancy + { + { +
Longevity risk { { { { {
Family size{consumption + § { { +
Intracohort di®erences { { + { {
Habit formation { { { + +
Flexible labor supply + + + { {
Endogenous wage + { + { {
Endogenous interest rate + { + { +
Credit constraint { § { { +
Bequest + { { { +
Taxes + + + { {
Surprise in pension policy { + { { §
Abbreviations: AHKN = Auerbach, Hagemann, Kotliko® and Nicoletti (1989), AS
= Simonovits (2003, Chapter 15. ) and the present paper, respectively.
We shall see that the ¯ve models are similar to each other in many dimensions, but
di®er from each other in other dimensions.
A common feature of the foregoing models is that instead of the popular two-
generation OLG models (cf. e.g. Hairault and Langot, 2008), they are based on multi-
cohort OLG models.
Since population aging is one of the most pressing problems of the 21st century,
these models take it into account. We must distinguish two dimensions: decreasing
fertility and increasing life expectancy. The latter can only be interpreted empirically
with considering longevity risk. Nevertheless, the consideration of longevity risk is
very di±cult in a micro-based macromodel: within every birth cohort, types should
be distinguished according to their life spans. Neither of the ¯ve models did so. De
Nardi, Imrohoroglu and Sargent (1999) were among the few who considered stochastic
life spans.
Blundell (1994) and BÄ utler (1997) empirically analyzed the connection between the
life-cycle consumption and the family size. It is surprising that many related pension
models neglect this important relation.
A great number of papers (e.g. Auerbach and Kotliko®, 1987) gloss over the intra-
cohort di®erences in earnings. Obviously, such di®erences are important in analyzing
2the various pension reforms. For example, the privatization of the public pension sys-
tem inevitably reduces the progressivity of pension system (Fehr, 2000). I apologize for
neglecting this important dimension myself.
If one considers the age at retirement as a free decision of the worker, then endoge-
nous labor supply should be modeled. Since the freedom of choosing the retirement age
is much less than generally assumed (see Augusztinovics and KÄ oll} o, 2008 and Spieza,
2002), our choice of exogenously given and raising retirement age is not that bad after
all.
The majority of consumption models neglect growth e®ects, and work with ab-
solute rather than relative consumption paths. Simplifying Carroll, Overland and Weil
(2000)|replacing actual consumption with trend value|we also take into account habit
formation.
One of the greatest innovations of Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987) was to study in-
tergenerational dynamics in the general equilibrium framework. They have not stopped
at maximizing the workers' lifetime utility functions for given wage and interest paths,
but in the dynamic framework of capital accumulation, they harmonized the wage and
interest paths with the individual decisions. This was a striking application of per-
fect foresight, but it is questionable if it describes the economic dynamics well. (Can
one explain the recent world economic crisis on the basis of perfect foresight or more
generally, rational expectations?) In a rather abstract analytical model (Moln¶ ar and
Simonovits, 1998), where every type of external change (wage, fertility, life expectancy)
was missing, we compared perfect foresight with naive expectations and proved that
the latter are more stable than the former. The present model tries to endogenize the
interest factor dynamics making it decreasing with the aging of population. This is in
accord with Brooks (2000) but contradicts Poterba (2001). BÄ orsch-Supan, Ludwig and
Winter (2002) hope that increased capital export from the developed countries into the
underdeveloped countries can solve the problems of population aging (see also Baker,
Delong and Krugman, 2005).
Hubbard and Judd (1986) and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) were among the
¯rst to consider the issue of credit constraint, when the consumers cannot ¯nance their
current consumption from future incomes. In this case it is not enough to consider a
single, lifetime budget constraint. This complication acquires a special signi¯cance at
considering certain scenarios of pre-funding of the pay-as-you-go pension system. Then
the myopic workers cannot ¯nance the raised contribution rate from decreasing their
voluntary savings. In a related approach, Kimball (1990) introduced the precautionary
savings into the model, when the uncertainty on future earnings forces the young to
save more than warranted in a deterministic world.
It is a basic, though hotly discussed question of life-cycle theory whether intended
bequest is a small part of capital accumulation (Ando and Modiglian, 1963) or a signif-
icant one (Kotliko® and Summers, 1981). In the present model, there is no longevity
risk, therefore all bequests are intended.
A modern economy cannot be described without taxes. In realistic pension models,
personal income taxes and value added taxes should appear. A lot of models incorporate
these taxes, ours do not.
The debate on pros and cons of the privatization of pension system has been very
lively for decades. Though our model can tackle this important issue, we delay its
3analysis to future publications..
In my book I have modeled important issues of pension reforms: the impact of index-
ation, the pre-funding of the pay-as-you-go system (Simonovits, 2003, Chapters 14 and
15), but neglected the demographic transition. Oksanen (2004) and Beetsma and Oksa-
nen (2007) studied the intergenerational equity of pension reforms in a three-generation
model. Together with Oksanen (2009), my paper was motivated to overcome the limi-
tations mentioned. Both papers describe the demographic structure more realistically,
taking into account the bequests and the workers' optimal saving paths. The di®erences
between them are quantitative rather than qualitative: Oksanen was able to incorporate
fractional decades into his model, worked out surprises in full and surveyed the litera-
ture in detail. On the other hand, the present paper models intertemporal substitution
and age-dependent wages, moreover, contains the full mathematical model.
Further scenarios will be discussed in future versions: privatization of part of the
public system, insurance against stochastic shocks etc.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines a
macromodel with given consumption paths. Section 3 introduces optimal consumption
paths to derive asset dynamics. Section 4 displays the numerical calculations. Section
5 concludes. The Appendix contains the more sophisticated proofs.
2. A macromodel
We start the presentation with a demographic block and continue with a wage- and a
pension block, yielding the macroblock.
2.1. Demographic block
Here we describe the demographic block which is simple enough (every member of a
given cohort dies at the same age) but works with cohorts rather than generations and
takes care of dropping fertility and increasing life expectancy.
Let t be the index of calendar periods, t = :::;¡1;0;1;::: but also :::;1940;1950;
1960;:::. We shall always use the following principle of notation: when a quantity
depends on age as well as on calendar time, then the ¯rst index refers to age, and the
second to the calendar time. Let us denote the number of aged i in period t by ni;t.
Concerning changing life expectancy, we must di®erentiate between so-called period
t life expectancy (the traditional term): It and the so-called cohort t life expectancy: It.
The former stands for the average age at which people die in t, the latter stands for the
average age at death of people born in t. We have the following relation between them:
It¡It = It. For example, if the expected age of people at death is equal to 80 in 2050,
then I1970 = I2050 = 80. It appears in the longitudinal, individual level (in lifetime
budget constraints), while It appears in the macrorelations (cross-sectional balances).
To get rid of the complexities of a two-sex world, we assume unisex single parents
and children. If the parent was born in period t, then all his children are born at once,
in period t+H, and their number is 2ft+H, ft+H staying with him/her, the other ft+H
with her/him, where H is a positive integer. A child stays with his parent until age
L, when he starts to work, L also being a positive integer. (Though both H and L
4have been increasing, we neglect this complication.) People born in t retire at age Jt,
generally a time-varying integer. Again, Jt¡Jt = Jt. We assume that only workers have
children in their household, i.e. L < H < Jt ¡ L.
To sum up, a person born in period t, starts working in period t + L, gives birth
to ft+H children in period t + H, separates from them in period t + H + L, retires in
period t + Jt and dies in period t + It.
We have the following demographic equations for t ¸ 0:
ni;t =
(ftnH;t if i = 0;
ni¡1;t¡1 if i = 1;:::;It;
0 if i > It.
In the transition of dynamic systems, we assume that the initial values of birth numbers,
namely n0;¡I0;n0;¡I0+1;:::;n0;¡1 are given.
Denote Nt =
PIt
i=0 ni;t the population size in period t, then growth factor of the





For stable populations, where ft = f and It = I, ºt = º = f1=H holds.
2.2. Wage block
Let us denote by wi;t the household head's total wage at age i in period t. We as-
sume that as time passes, the earning{age function is multiplied by the time-invariant
productivity growth factor g > 1:
wi;t = wi;Lgt¡L = wigt¡L; i = L + 1;L + 2;:::;Jt and t = ¡2;¡1;0;1;2;:::;
where wi is the wage of the i-aged in period L and wL;L = wL = 1. (Note that the
wage structure may depend on the demographic situation, as is persuasively argued by
Akihiko (2006, Figure 35, p. 143), but we neglect this fact.) Later on, it will be useful
to de¯ne wi;t+i = 0 for i > Jt.





The endogenous interest factor is determined as the product of a constant ® > 1





Note that this is a simpli¯cation that makes the present model a partial equilibrium
model. In the dynamic general equilibrium theory, the interest factor is determined
from the macroequilibrium conditions: either assuming perfect foresight concerning the
interest rate (e.g. Auerbach and Kotliko®, 1987) or naive expectations (cf. Moln¶ ar and
Simonovits, 1998). In steady states, R = ®ºg.
52.3. Pension block
Here we outline our pension block, ¯rst a pay-as-you-go public pension system and
income yi;t is either net wage (1 ¡ ¿)wi;t or pension bene¯t bi;t. We have already met
retirement age Jt of the person born in period t (an integer) and the retirement age Jt in
period t+Jt, determined by the government. We can now describe the pension system as
follows. Our individual, born in t, contributes ¿i;t+iwi;t+i to the public pension system
at age i = L;L + 1;:::;Jt and receives a pension bene¯t bi;t+i at age i = Jt + 1;:::;It.
Thus his income path changes as follows:
yi;t+i =
½
(1 ¡ ¿t+i)wigt¡L+i if L · i · Jt;
bi;t+i if Jt < i · It.
We assume a pension system, where the entry bene¯t is given as a linear function of








Note that in practice, µt+j and ¿j;t+j may change in time, but in theory, if we as-
sume time-invariant accrual rate µ and contribution rate ¿, then the entry bene¯t is
proportional to valorized lifetime net earnings (1 ¡ ¿) ^ wt+Jt+1:









The continued bene¯ts are wage-price-indexed with shares ¶t and 1¡¶t, respectively:
bi+1;t+i+1 = bi;t+ig¶t; i = Jt + 1;:::;It ¡ 1:
We consider the individual pension wealth which plays a prominent role in the eval-
uation of the cohort-speci¯c burden of unfunded pension systems. We shall de¯ne the
implicit pension wealth di;t+i of a person born in t at age i as the present value of out-
standing pension bene¯ts at the end of this period. To formulate the implicit pension




Rt for z > v and ½v;v = 1:
For a worker, who was born in period t, his earning wh;t+h in period t + h will
yield pension \part" µt+h(1 ¡ ¿h;t+h)wh;t+hgi¡h in period t + i, for h = L;:::;Jt and
i = Jt+1;:::;It. Taking account of wh;t+h = wh;Lgt+h¡L, summing up, and discounting









t+j;t+i; j = L;:::;Jt:
6A pensioner's pension wealth is equal to the sum of the remaining claims between






t+i;t+h; i = Jt + 1;:::;It:
In aggregate relations, pro¯les rather than paths appear. (Pension wealth pro¯les
are derived in the Appendix.) The pension system need not be balanced, i.e. the










Aggregating the individual implicit pension wealths, the aggregate implicit pension











If the retirement age Jt is constant, then the pension system is called intergener-
ationally equitable if the total pension debt grows parallel with the output: Dt=Yt is
constant. If the retirement age varies in time, then a more sophisticated de¯nition is
needed (see Beetsma and Oksanen, 2007).
In a lot of countries in a lot of periods, pension systems are purely pay-as-you-go,










In a general model, (bi;t) give the initial conditions and then ¿o
t is determined. Note,
however, that (bi;t) depend in turn on ¿¡J1+t;:::;¿¡1+t. If we do not want to de¯ne
initial contribution rates, we may assume that the system started in a steady state.
Then with substitution, and assuming wage-indexed pensions with ¶t = 1: bi;t = bt and
denoting the number of pensioners by Pt yields a steady-state equation and contribution
rate:
¿Wt = µPt ^ wt ¡ ¿µPt ^ wt; i:e: ¿ =
µPt ^ wt
Wt + µPt ^ wt
; t < 0:
Until now we have neglected consumption paths; from now we can derive them form
individual life-cycle optimization.
73. Optimal consumption paths
In this section ¯rst we discuss a simple life-cycle model, where households maximize a
standard lifetime utility function under a standard lifetime budget constraint. Second,
we introduce complications like habit formation, inheritance and credit constraint and
shocks. This helps us derive asset dynamics, as well as opening the way to consider the
partial prefunding of the unfunded pension system.
3.1. A simple household life-cycle model
As is usual, we build up the household consumption block from microeconomic variables.
Let us denote ci;t the household head's consumption at age i in period t. At this stage,
we take the adult consumption as given and delay its explanation for a while.
Consider an adult born in period t and his household in later periods. We assume
that each child consumes ¹ times as his parent does (0 < ¹ · 1). Let us denote the
household consumption size by mi;t (cf. Meier and Wrede, 2005). Then we have
mi;t+i =
½
1 + ¹ft+H if H · i < H + L;
1 if L · i < H or H + L · i · It.





The end-of-period accumulated assets ai;t+i and the per-period saving si;t+i of a
household are de¯ned as
ai;t+i = Rt+iai¡1;t¡1+i + yi;t+i ¡ mi;t+i ci;t+i
and
si;t+i = ai;t+i ¡ ai¡1;t¡1+i = ai¡1;t¡1(Rt+i ¡ 1) + yi;t+i ¡ mi;t+i ci;t+i;
respectively. The initial and end values of assets are equal to zero: aL¡1;t = 0 = aIt;t.








By de¯nition, At = RtAt¡1 + St.
Since working households pay pension contributions and pensioner households re-
ceive pension bene¯ts, income yi;t+i di®ers from earning wi;t+i. Therefore, we shall
formulate the budget constraint with the former rather than the latter. Using the cap-
ital (present) values of incomes and consumption in period t + L, the lifetime budget





t+L;t+i(yi;t+i ¡ mi;t+i ci;t+i) = 0:
8To determine the optimal consumption path (ci;t+i)
It
t=L, we assume the following




where 0 < ± · 1 is the discount factor and ui(ci;t+i) is the household head's per-period
utility function at age i. To take care of the age-speci¯c and time-variant household
size, we assume that the per-period utility function at age i is equal to a time-invariant
per-capita utility function multiplied by the size of the household and indicator variable
¯i;t+i, equaling to 1 if the consumer works and dropping to 0 < ¯ < 1 if he is retired
(cf. Scholz, Sheshadri and Khitatrakun, 2006):




1 if L · i · Jt;
¯ if Jt < i · It.




1 ¡ ° if ° > 1;
logx if ° = 1.
(To take into account the inelastic intertemporal substitution, we exclude the case 0 ·
° < 1.)













ci;t+i = ±(i¡L)=°(½t+L;t+i ¯i;t+i)1=°cL;t+L; i = L + 1;L + 2;:::;It:
For future use (e.g. at the reoptimization after shocks), it will be worthwhile to
derive another form of optimal consumption path, which does not distinguish between
initial and continued consumptions. On the other hand, it also relies on ai¡1;t¡1 de¯ning
the capital value of the remaining life path. Because ¯L;t = 1 but ¯i;t may be di®erent
from 1, 1=¯i;t appears in the denominator.











and determine ai;t and ci;t+1, respectively.
93.2. A complex life-cycle model
Having discussed the simple life cycle block, it is time to introduce the complexities:
habit formation, inheritance and credit constraint.
Since the bulk of the income is wage, and the other components like pensions and
bequests more or less also follow wage dynamics, we assume the following habit formation
mechanism. Optimizing their consumption paths, people care for relative rather than
absolute consumption values, for example, this year's consumption relative to last year's
one or to a trend. Therefore the utility function should also re°ect the secular increase
in productivity (see Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000) for habit formation with actual
rather than secular consumption base). The simplest way of modeling this phenomenon
is to work with a utility function, where the per capita consumption ci;t+i is discounted
by the productivity level gt+i
ui;t+i(ci;t+i) = ¯i;t+i mi;t+i u(ci;t+i=gt+i):
Hence the optimal consumption path is
ci;t+i = ±(i¡L)=°(½t+L;t+i ¯i;t+i)1=°cL;tgi¡L; i = L + 1;L + 2;:::;It;













Taking into account that ¯i;t may di®er from 1, the recursive form of consumption










t;t+j¡i (¯j;t+j¡i=¯i;t)1=° mj;t+j¡i gj¡i
and calculate ai;t and ci;t alternatingly.
The second complication is connected with the inheritance. As is well-known, parents
leave bequest to their children. We replace the unrealistic in¯nite chain of bequest
motives ¶ a la Barro (1974) by a simple but sensible solution. Denoting the capital value





and assuming that each parent leaves a given share (say ·) of this variable at his death
in t as a bequest, i.e. qt = · ¹ wt. The age of his heirs is Ft = It ¡ H. Since the bequest
is divided among ft¡Ft heirs, the per capita bequest received is q¤
t = qt=ft¡Ft. Denote
by ^ yi;t the extended income in period t which is the sum of standard income plus the
signed bequest (bequest received has a positive, bequest left has a negative sign):
^ yi;t = yi;t +
(
qt=ft¡Ft if i = Ft;
¡qt if i = It;
0 otherwise.
10Then the earlier identities are modi¯ed:
ai;t = Rtai¡1;t¡1 + ^ yi;t ¡ mi;t ci;t
and
si;t = ai¡1;t¡1(Rt ¡ 1) + ^ yi;t ¡ mi;t ci;t;
respectively. With the extended income, the previous formula remains valid, only a hat












A third complication is the presence of credit constraint: the assets cannot be neg-
ative (Hubbard and Judd, 1986 and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995): ai ¸ 0,
i = L;L+1;:::;It¡1;It. Credit constraints are especially stringent when children need
to be fed from low starting earnings, further diminished by signi¯cant public pension
contributions. Note, however, that Hubbard et al. neglected the \family composition
changes" (p. 393), a cornerstone of our model.
The optimization problem under credit constraint is not that simple but in our
numerical setting, Heikki Oksanen's algorithm is quite satisfactory.
Under low enough pensions and fertility and high enough wages, the credit constraint
is not e®ective at all. In other cases we can choose an appropriate date between the
arrival of the bequest and the age when the children leave the family:
t + Ft · Kt · t + L + H ¡ 1 or t + L + H ¡ 1 · Kt · t + Ft:
Similarly, let
Ft · Vt · L + H ¡ 1 or L + H ¡ 1 · Vt · Ft:
Cut the optimization process into two by Kt, or equivalently, Vt.
(1) Calculate the model for the time-periods [t +L;Kt], or equivalently, ages [L;Vt]
(2) Calculate the model for the time-periods [Kt;t+It] or ages (Vt;It] with bequest
received at the end Kt and bequest left at the end t + It.
We can unify the two cases by introducing the notation
Mi;t =
½
Vt if L · i · Vt;
It¡i if Vt¡i < i · It¡i.
Here the extended incomes ^ yi;t+is are helpful, since the bequest to be received and left










t;t+j¡i (¯j;t+j¡i=¯i;t)1=° mj;t+j¡i gj¡i
and determine ai;t and Mi;t, respectively.
11Note that in our heuristic solution, the assets may become slightly negative around
Vt. The simplest way to tackle this complication is to say that such small credits are
possible. The perfect solution would demand a much more complex algorithm but in
this paper we skip it.
Initial asset conditions are given as (ai;¡1). Of course, the simplest case is to assume
that they were the result of previous optimization, most notably in a steady-state one.
In more detail, we must go back to ¡I0. Consider the optimization procedure of the
consumer who was born in t = ¡I0 and entered the labor market in t = L¡I0 with asset
aL¡1;L¡I0¡1 = 0. Solving the optimization problem yields the asset path (ai;¡I0+i)
I0
i=L,







Until now we have neglected the shocks which may hit the system and necessitates
subsequent reoptimization. Now we ¯ll up the gap. Suppose that the government
abruptly changes its exogenous policy parameter values µt, ¶t and Jt and later on, even
¿t in period T. Denote the changed values by tilde. For notational simpli¯cation,
in ~ yi;t+i will drop the hat. Then the workers and pensioners must also change their
remaining consumption paths. Due to the changes in the policy paths, the income
~ yi;t+i also changes for t ¸ T.












There are at least two ways of de¯ning the expected incomes ~ yi;t: a) under per-
fect foresight, the workers correctly foresee the relevant future values of µt, ¶t and ¿t,
respectively:
µr
t = µt; ¶r
t = ¶t and ¿r
t = ¿t; t = 0;1;:::;
b) under naive expectations, the workers naively identify the relevant future values of
µt, ¶t and ¿t by their trend values, respectively:
µn
p = µt; ¶
p
t = ¶t and ¿n
p = ¿t; p = t + 1;:::; t = 0;1;:::;:
For e = r;n, ~ ye
i;t contains ¿e
v and µe
v, with v < t, respectively. First we shall use only
perfect foresight, but then we shall also consider naive expectations.
4. Numerical results
We have formulated our model but it is so complex that we can only analyze it with
the aid of a computer. To simplify the presentation, as a prelude, we use decades rather
than years. The drawback of this simpli¯cation that the new values for age and time
are also integers, making the transition extremely abrupt.
124.1. Base run
First we describe our base run. We start displaying our numerical results with the
demographic block. Assume that the end of childhood, the ages at birth and death are
as follows: L = 2, H = 3 and I = 6.
Let start the dynamics in t = 0 (calendar time 1950) and assume that the previous
7 decades have time indices t = ¡7;¡6;:::;¡1.
Fertility started to diminish uniformly in t = 2 (1970) from 1 to 0.79 in 3 decades,





f1 if t < T1f;
f1 + ¢f(t ¡ T1f) if T1f · t · T2f;
f2 if t > T2f,
where f2 ¡ f1 = ¢f(T2f ¡ T1f).
Numerical values: f1 = 1 > f2 = 0:79, ¢f = 0:07, T1f = 2, T2f = 5.




I1 if t < T I;
I2 if t ¸ TI.
The parameter values are as follows: I1 = 6 and I2 = 7, TI = 5. For better under-
standing, we spell out this change: It jumps from I4 = 6 in 1990 to I5 = 7 in 2000.
For the time being, we set the retirement age low and time invariant: J0;t = 5 but
later on we shall modify it.
We shall assume that the initial population was stationary:
n0;¡I0 = n0;¡I0+1 = ::: = n0;¡1 = 1
and the fertility was unitary: f¡I0 = ¢¢¢ = f¡1 = 1.
The left part of Table 1a displays the size of the subpopulations of children, workers
and pensioners. In our setup, the jump in life expectancy only delays but does not
counterbalance the impact of the drop in fertility, and the total population begins to
decrease again. The real problem is the spectacular rise in the share of pensioners.
Making use of the fact that the pension block can be solved without solving the
consumption block, ¯rst we concentrate on the former.
Let us assume that the wage-dynamics can be described by a quadratic function
(Mincer, 1974):
wi;t = (!0 + !1i ¡ !2i2)gt¡L; i = L + 1;:::;Jt:
We shall assume that the starting relative wage is 1: !0 + !1L ¡ !2L2 = 1 and we
shall work with a modest rise about 20%, reached at the initial retirement age i = J0.
Numerically, !0 = 0:664, !1 = 0:222 and !2 = 0:022.
Having chosen ® = 1:01510, and g = 1:017510, we can now determine the aggregate
total wage and the interest factor series.
Let us assume an accrual rate µt = 0:022£10. To get rid of awkward initial conditions
on ¿t for t = ¡7;¡6;:::;0;1, we determine them as steady state contribution rates.
13Because of aging, from t = 2 (1970), the equilibrium contribution rate ¿o
t will rises from
0.18 to 0.39 by t = 7 (2020) and then oscillates a little bit around 0.355. Finally, let
us underline the steep rise of the implicit pension debt in terms of total wages during
1930 and 2010: from 0.33 to 0.94. At the end it stabilizes around 0.75. (Note that in
our decade model, this stock/°ow ratio is much lower than it would be in an annual
model.)
Turning to the consumption path (Table 1b), we must de¯ne the parameters of the
utility function: ° = 4 = elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ¯ = 0:7 = utility
correction, ±1=10 = 1=R
1=10
A = 1=(®g)1=10 = 0:9682768 = annualized discount factor. In
addition, ¹ = 0:5 = equivalent consumption coe±cient.
Rising contribution rates reduce individual net incomes. This reduction implies
proportionally diminished consumption and saving decisions. For example, in t = 0
(1950), the adult consumption pro¯le corresponds to the starting steady-state optimum.
(Numbers are given in terms of the current total wages of the youngest worker, our
numeraire). In the next decades, the pro¯le adjusts itself to the new circumstances.
The consumption pro¯le stabilizes around t = 13 (2080) at a closing steady state.
Asset dynamics (Table 1.c) is a simple consequence of the income and consumption
paths. Note that the critical age (when the middle-life assets are zero) drops from 4
to 3. The issue of credit constraints becomes really important when privatization and
prefunding will be studied in further studies.
4.2. Alternative policies with perfect foresight
We shall now consider other scenarios, where the government reacts to the demographic
change has been taking place since t = 2 (1970). Alternative pension reforms are
introduced in t = 6 (2010). We shall study three di®erent policies: (i) decreasing the
accrual rates, (ii) replacing wage indexation of pensions with price indexation and (iii)
raising the retirement age. For the time being, it will be assumed that all the policy
changes are correctly anticipated by the public: perfect foresight.
(i) Decreasing the accrual rates
Here the pension accrual is immediately decreased from µ0 = 0:022 £ 10 to µT =
0:015 £ 10 in t = 6, while keeping retirement age constant. To avoid duplication,
the data of early periods|with invariant data|are omitted. Thus from Table 2.a, the
numbers of the unchanged demographic block are dropped.
Note that with the relative drop in the (per capita) entry pension, with an overshoot-
ing to 0.39, the contribution rate stabilizes at a lower value, namely at 0.28. Also note
that because of the reduced contribution rates, the pension bene¯ts are lower than in the
base run but not proportionally to the reduced accrual rates: b60;2100 = 0:493 < 0:637
is a drop 23% rather than the drop 32% in accrual rates. Similarly, the implicit pension
debt also diminishes since 2020, and faster than in the base run.
Table 2.b contains the data of the consumption block. (For brevity, the unchanged
column of bequest is deleted.) It is worth starting the comparison in the row 2010:
due to the lower contribution rates, the two youngest cohorts consumption signi¯cantly
rises, the others' diminishes. For example, c40;2010 drops from 0.697 to 0.657. Turning
to the comparison of transitions: the older cohorts of transition lose especially.
14(ii) Replacing wage indexation by price indexation
Here the wage indexation rule is replaced by a price indexation rule in period t = 6
(2010). Tables 3.a{3.b contain the relevant data. Similarly to the reduced accrual rate,
the moderation of indexation also reduces the contribution rates: ¿2100 = 0:338 < 0:355
but raises the entry pensions: b60;2100 = 0:656 > 0:637. The consumption pro¯les in the
closing steady states are similar, but there are dramatic changes during the transition:
for example, c60;2010 drops from 0.662 to 0.640, while c20;2010 jumps from 0.547 to 0.575.
(iii) Raising the retirement ages
Here the retirement age Jt is immediately raised from 5 to 6 (in 2010). Tables 4.a{4.b
contain the descriptions, reinstating the changed demographic block.
The radical rise in the retirement age restores and even improves the pensioner-to-
worker ratio of 2/3.8=0.526 in 2000 to 1/4.58=0.218 in 2010. Small wonder that the
contribution rate returns from the very high 0.38 toward the initial value, now 0.216.
At the same time, longer employment increases entry pensions (from 0.637 to 0.978 in
2100), nevertheless reducing the high implicit pension debt ratio from 0.734 to 0.451.
The consumption also signi¯cantly increases with respect to the base run: c20;2100 =
0:701 > 0:575 etc. Now the transition cohorts' consumption rises rather than drops:
c40;2020 = 0:955 vs. 0.683. It is another question that these cohort must work much
longer, thus they lose leisure.
4.3. Alternative policies with naive expectations
We turn now to the more realistic case, when the public is totally surprised by the
changes in pension policy: naive expectations. To save space, we only report those
decades when the change is unexpected and con¯ne our attention to the consumption
paths. Nevertheless, we add the consumption blocks of the other two scenarios: Tables
5.b{c.
When the decrease in the accrual rates is unexpected (Table 5a), then the con-
sumption path of the cohort entering its 4th decade is changed between 2000 and 2030:
c40;2000 jumps from 0.694 to 0.717; c50;2010 drops from 0.685 to 0.671 and the drop
continues.
4.4. Removing complications
Having worked out our model, it is worth checking the impact of complications on the
results. We will see that the impact is important. In Tables 6b and c we simultaneously
remove the four complications introduced in Section 3: habit formation, inheritance,
credit constraint and changing family size. (Table 6a would have been identical to
Table 1a.) To save space, we con¯ne the comparison to the base run. For example,
the consumption values are uniformly higher (for example, c20;1930 is 0.906 rather than
0.764) and total assets are negative (A1930 = ¡0:049) rather than positive (0.092). More
detailed investigations would check the individual impact of the omitted factors.
5. Conclusions
We have just started to work on this model family, therefore we have not taken into
account important details, for example, interest rates derived from capital accumulation
15and ¯ne demographic details. We must work a lot until we arrive to more de¯nite results.
Nevertheless, our early experiments have already testi¯ed the power of our approach:
we have obtained meaningful results on the qualitative di®erences between alternative
scenarios with or without foresight.
Appendix: Some proofs
The Appendix contains two parts: the derivations of pension wealth pro¯les and of the
optimal consumption path.
Pension wealth pro¯les
We shall need cross-sectional pro¯les rather than longitudinal path. To do so we must
deduct Jt, j and i respectively from the corresponding indices starting with t.














t;t+i¡j; j = L;:::;Jt:






t;t+h¡i; i = Jt¡1 + 1;:::;It:
Optimal consumption paths
Here is the derivation of the optimal consumption path. Introduce the Lagrange function











t+L;t+i; i = L;L + 1;:::;It:
Comparing the multipliers for i and L, results in
±i¡L¯i;t+i½t+L;t+iu0(ci;t+i) = ¯L;t+Lu0(cL;t+L):
Since ¯L;t+L = 1, we drop it, but later on we shall need it again.
Substituting ci;t+is into the budget constraint, cL;t+L is determined, hence the entire
consumption path is determined.
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All the per capita variables are given in terms of the current wage of the youngest.
All the aggregate variables are related to current total wage bill
Table 1.a. Population and pensions: Base run
Annualized
Pension- interest Entry Contribu-
Decades Kids Workers ers factor bene¯ts tion rate IPD/Wage
t Kt Mt Pt R
1=10
t bt=wL;t ¿t Dt=Wt
1930 2.000 4.000 1.000 1.033 0.809 0.180 0.330
1940 2.000 4.000 1.000 1.033 0.809 0.180 0.330
1950 2.000 4.000 1.000 1.033 0.809 0.180 0.350
1960 2.000 4.000 1.000 1.033 0.809 0.180 0.402
1970 1.930 4.000 1.000 1.033 0.809 0.180 0.500
1980 1.790 4.000 1.000 1.033 0.809 0.180 0.663
1990 1.650 3.930 1.000 1.031 0.809 0.183 0.700
2000 1.525 3.790 2.000 1.029 0.809 0.379 0.911
2010 1.414 3.580 2.000 1.027 0.756 0.387 0.941
2020 1.303 3.315 2.000 1.025 0.703 0.390 0.932
2030 1.205 3.064 1.930 1.025 0.651 0.378 0.920
2040 1.117 2.828 1.790 1.025 0.609 0.354 0.907
2050 1.030 2.619 1.650 1.025 0.616 0.342 0.911
2060 0.952 2.421 1.525 1.025 0.627 0.347 0.841
2070 0.883 2.234 1.414 1.025 0.638 0.355 0.783
2080 0.814 2.069 1.303 1.025 0.643 0.357 0.745
2090 0.752 1.912 1.205 1.025 0.641 0.358 0.727
2100 0.697 1.765 1.117 1.025 0.637 0.359 0.734
2150 0.469 1.193 0.752 1.025 0.637 0.355 0.752
17Table 1.b. Consumption: Base run
Bequest Saving
Decade cons(2) cons(3) cons(4) cons(5) cons(6) cons(7) left rate
t c2=wL;t c3;t=wL;t c4;t=wL;t c5;t=wL;t c6;t=wL;t c7;t=wL;t qt=wL;t ¾t
1930 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.783 0.716 0 0.326 0.013
1940 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.783 0.716 0 0.326 0.013
1950 0.770 0.764 0.764 0.783 0.716 0 0.326 0.012
1960 0.783 0.770 0.764 0.783 0.716 0 0.326 0.007
1970 0.796 0.783 0.770 0.783 0.716 0 0.326 0.008
1980 0.749 0.796 0.783 0.816 0.716 0 0.326 0.013
1990 0.641 0.708 0.740 0.821 0.744 0 0 0.070
2000 0.551 0.636 0.717 0.734 0.744 0.737 0.361 {0.011
2010 0.547 0.543 0.697 0.707 0.662 0.734 0.342 0.016
2020 0.551 0.537 0.683 0.683 0.634 0.649 0.320 0.027
2030 0.568 0.540 0.700 0.669 0.613 0.622 0.304 0.025
2040 0.584 0.556 0.713 0.686 0.600 0.601 0.293 0.020
2050 0.587 0.573 0.719 0.700 0.616 0.589 0.288 0.015
2060 0.581 0.575 0.716 0.705 0.627 0.604 0.287 0.010
2070 0.576 0.570 0.712 0.702 0.632 0.615 0.286 0.007
2080 0.575 0.565 0.709 0.698 0.630 0.620 0.287 0.010
2090 0.574 0.563 0.708 0.696 0.626 0.618 0.287 0.012
2100 0.575 0.563 0.709 0.694 0.624 0.614 0.286 0.012
2150 0.576 0.566 0.710 0.697 0.625 0.613 0.287 0.012
18Table 1.c. Assets: Base run
Decades asset(2) asset(3) asset(4) asset(5) asset(6) Total assets
t a2;t=wL;t a3;t=wL;t a4;t=wL;t a5;t=wL;t a6;t=wL;t At=wL;t
1930 0.056 0.156 0 0.201 0 0.092
1940 0.056 0.156 0 0.201 0 0.092
1950 0.050 0.156 0 0.201 0 0.090
1960 0.037 0.140 0 0.201 0 0.084
1970 0.024 0.133 0 0.201 0 0.080
1980 0.070 0.126 0 0.167 0 0.081
1990 0.176 0 0.074 0.160 0.257 0.148
2000 0.070 0 0.092 0.095 0.244 0.115
2010 0.066 0 0.118 0.130 0.199 0.121
2020 0.059 0 0.139 0.175 0.208 0.143
2030 0.054 0 0.140 0.225 0.226 0.159
2040 0.063 0 0.137 0.239 0.250 0.170
2050 0.072 0 0.138 0.238 0.256 0.173
2060 0.072 0 0.133 0.227 0.255 0.170
2070 0.069 0 0.129 0.215 0.250 0.164
2080 0.068 0 0.130 0.211 0.244 0.161
2090 0.068 0 0.131 0.214 0.242 0.161
2100 0.066 0 0.129 0.216 0.243 0.162
2150 0.069 0 0.132 0.217 0.244 0.163
19Table 2.a. Pensions: Anticipated reduction of accrual rate
Entry Contribu-
Decades bene¯ts tion rate IPD/Wage
t bt=wL;t ¿t Dt=Wt
1990 0.809 0.183 0.700
2000 0.809 0.379 0.911
2010 0.756 0.387 0.941
2020 0.651 0.376 0.920
2030 0.552 0.337 0.897
2040 0.468 0.287 0.875
2050 0.441 0.254 0.870
2060 0.464 0.252 0.804
2070 0.485 0.266 0.677
2080 0.495 0.273 0.588
2090 0.497 0.277 0.542
2100 0.493 0.278 0.540
2150 0.469 0.273 0.580
Table 2.b. Consumption: Anticipated reduction of accrual rate
Saving
Decade cons(2) cons(3) cons(4) cons(5) cons(6) cons(7) rate
t c2=wL;t c3;t=wL;t c4;t=wL;t c5;t=wL;t c6;t=wL;t c7;t=wL;t ¾t
1990 0.641 0.708 0.740 0.821 0.744 0 0.070
2000 0.551 0.636 0.694 0.734 0.744 0.737 {0.005
2010 0.553 0.543 0.657 0.685 0.662 0.734 0.031
2020 0.576 0.543 0.637 0.644 0.614 0.649 0.050
2030 0.616 0.565 0.656 0.624 0.578 0.602 0.052
2040 0.653 0.604 0.687 0.643 0.560 0.566 0.043
2050 0.668 0.640 0.706 0.674 0.577 0.549 0.031
2060 0.663 0.655 0.706 0.692 0.605 0.565 0.019
2070 0.653 0.650 0.700 0.693 0.620 0.593 0.013
2080 0.649 0.641 0.695 0.687 0.621 0.608 0.014
2090 0.647 0.636 0.693 0.682 0.616 0.609 0.017
2100 0.648 0.634 0.692 0.679 0.611 0.604 0.017
2150 0.650 0.638 0.695 0.682 0.611 0.599 0.018
20Table 3.a. Population and pensions: From wage to price indexation
Entry Contribu-
Decades bene¯ts tion rate IPD/Wage
t bt=wL;t ¿t Dt=Wt
1990 0.809 0.183 0.700
2000 0.809 0.379 0.884
2010 0.756 0.355 0.914
2020 0.711 0.360 0.908
2030 0.668 0.352 0.899
2040 0.631 0.333 0.889
2050 0.642 0.326 0.893
2060 0.650 0.331 0.823
2070 0.657 0.336 0.774
2080 0.660 0.337 0.744
2090 0.659 0.338 0.730
2100 0.656 0.338 0.738
2150 0.656 0.336 0.750
Table 3.b. Consumption: Anticipated transition from wage to price indexation
Saving
Decade cons(2) cons(3) cons(4) cons(5) cons(6) cons(7) rate
t c2=wL;t c3;t=wL;t c4;t=wL;t c5;t=wL;t c6;t=wL;t c7;t=wL;t ¾t
1990 0.641 0.708 0.715 0.779 0.744 0 0.085
2000 0.565 0.636 0.706 0.709 0.707 0.737 0.005
2010 0.575 0.557 0.700 0.696 0.640 0.697 0.028
2020 0.576 0.564 0.688 0.687 0.625 0.627 0.029
2030 0.588 0.565 0.704 0.675 0.616 0.612 0.023
2040 0.600 0.577 0.712 0.690 0.605 0.604 0.019
2050 0.601 0.588 0.714 0.698 0.619 0.593 0.016
2060 0.596 0.589 0.712 0.700 0.626 0.607 0.012
2070 0.594 0.585 0.709 0.698 0.628 0.614 0.011
2080 0.593 0.582 0.708 0.696 0.626 0.616 0.013
2090 0.593 0.581 0.707 0.694 0.624 0.614 0.014
2100 0.593 0.581 0.707 0.693 0.622 0.612 0.014
2150 0.594 0.583 0.708 0.695 0.623 0.611 0.014
21Table 4.a. Population and pensions: Anticipated jump in the retirement age
Annualized
Pension- interest Entry Contribu-
Decades Kids Workers ers factor bene¯ts tion rate IPD/Wage
t Kt Mt Pt R
1=10
t bt=wL;t ¿t Dt=Wt
1990 1.650 3.930 1.000 1.031 0.809 0.183 0.575
2000 1.525 3.790 2.000 1.029 0.809 0.379 0.724
2010 1.414 4.580 1.000 1.054 0.970 0.186 0.460
2020 1.303 4.315 1.000 1.027 0.967 0.197 0.475
2030 1.205 3.994 1.000 1.025 0.964 0.212 0.476
2040 1.117 3.688 0.930 1.025 0.959 0.212 0.476
2050 1.030 3.409 0.860 1.025 0.956 0.212 0.475
2060 0.952 3.155 0.790 1.025 0.992 0.218 0.476
2070 0.883 2.914 0.735 1.025 0.984 0.218 0.439
2080 0.814 2.693 0.679 1.025 0.980 0.217 0.443
2090 0.752 2.493 0.624 1.025 0.978 0.215 0.448
2100 0.697 2.302 0.580 1.025 0.978 0.216 0.451
2150 0.469 1.556 0.390 1.025 0.978 0.215 0.456
Table 4.b. Consumption: Anticipated jump in the retirement age
Bequest Saving
Decade cons(2) cons(3) cons(4) cons(5) cons(6) cons(7) left rate
t c2=wL;t c3;t=wL;t c4;t=wL;t c5;t=wL;t c6;t=wL;t c7;t=wL;t qt=wL;t ¾t
1990 0.641 0.708 0.763 0.822 0.744 0 0 0.063
2000 0.619 0.636 0.804 0.756 0.746 0.737 0.361 {0.051
2010 0.722 0.651 0.955 0.846 0.795 0.784 0.525 0.061
2020 0.712 0.712 0.955 0.941 0.833 0.717 0.486 0.027
2030 0.705 0.698 0.962 0.936 0.923 0.748 0.443 0.007
2040 0.705 0.691 0.947 0.943 0.918 0.828 0.406 {0.006
2050 0.703 0.692 0.934 0.928 0.924 0.823 0.376 {0.005
2060 0.700 0.689 0.924 0.916 0.910 0.829 0.351 {0.001
2070 0.700 0.686 0.924 0.906 0.898 0.816 0.350 0.003
2080 0.702 0.687 0.925 0.906 0.888 0.805 0.349 0.005
2090 0.702 0.688 0.925 0.907 0.889 0.797 0.350 0.008
2100 0.701 0.688 0.925 0.907 0.889 0.797 0.350 0.006
2150 0.702 0.688 0.925 0.907 0.890 0.798 0.350 0.007
22Table 5.a. Consumption: Unanticipated reduction of accrual rate
Decade cons(2) cons(3) cons(4) cons(5) cons(6) cons(7)
t c2=wL;t c3;t=wL;t c4;t=wL;t c5;t=wL;t c6;t=wL;t c7;t=wL;t
1990 0.641 0.708 0.740 0.821 0.744 0
2000 0.551 0.636 0.717 0.734 0.744 0.737
2010 0.553 0.543 0.657 0.671 0.662 0.734
2020 0.576 0.543 0.637 0.644 0.602 0.649
2030 0.616 0.565 0.656 0.624 0.578 0.591
2040 0.653 0.604 0.687 0.643 0.560 0.566
2050 0.668 0.640 0.706 0.674 0.577 0.549
Table 5.b. Consumption: Unanticipated transition from wage to price indexation
Decade cons(2) cons(3) cons(4) cons(5) cons(6) cons(7)
t c2=wL;t c3;t=wL;t c4;t=wL;t c5;t=wL;t c6;t=wL;t c7;t=wL;t
1990 0.641 0.708 0.740 0.821 0.744 0
2000 0.551 0.636 0.717 0.734 0.744 0.737
2010 0.562 0.543 0.687 0.670 0.603 0.734
2020 0.579 0.551 0.688 0.674 0.601 0.592
2030 0.592 0.568 0.705 0.674 0.605 0.589
2040 0.603 0.580 0.715 0.691 0.604 0.593
2050 0.602 0.591 0.716 0.701 0.620 0.593
Table 5.c. Consumption: Unanticipated jump in the retirement age
Decade cons(2) cons(3) cons(4) cons(5) cons(6) cons(7)
t c2=wL;t c3;t=wL;t c4;t=wL;t c5;t=wL;t c6;t=wL;t c7;t=wL;t
1990 0.641 0.708 0.740 0.821 0.744 0
2000 0.551 0.636 0.717 0.734 0.744 0.737
2010 0.735 0.744 0.965 0.927 0.865 0.629
2020 0.710 0.725 0.955 0.951 0.913 0.779
2030 0.704 0.697 0.962 0.936 0.933 0.819
2040 0.704 0.690 0.945 0.943 0.918 0.836
2050 0.701 0.690 0.933 0.927 0.924 0.823
23Table 6.b. Consumption: Base run without complications
Saving
Decade cons(2) cons(3) cons(4) cons(5) cons(6) cons(7) rate
t c2=wL;t c3;t=wL;t c4;t=wL;t c5;t=wL;t c6;t=wL;t c7;t=wL;t ¾t
1930 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.829 0 {0.008
1940 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.829 0 {0.008
1950 0.907 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.829 0 {0.008
1960 0.908 0.907 0.906 0.906 0.829 0 {0.009
1970 0.862 0.908 0.905 0.906 0.829 0 0.002
1980 0.812 0.862 0.908 0.905 0.829 0 0.028
1990 0.758 0.809 0.859 0.904 0.824 0 0.071
2000 0.708 0.751 0.802 0.852 0.820 0.817 {0.052
2010 0.719 0.699 0.741 0.791 0.768 0.809 {0.047
2020 0.733 0.706 0.685 0.727 0.710 0.754 {0.038
2030 0.746 0.719 0.692 0.672 0.652 0.696 {0.023
2040 0.752 0.731 0.705 0.678 0.602 0.639 {0.005
2050 0.751 0.738 0.717 0.691 0.608 0.591 0.004
2060 0.746 0.736 0.723 0.703 0.620 0.597 {0.002
2070 0.743 0.731 0.722 0.709 0.630 0.608 {0.008
2080 0.743 0.728 0.717 0.708 0.636 0.618 {0.010
2090 0.744 0.728 0.714 0.703 0.635 0.624 {0.010
2100 0.744 0.729 0.714 0.700 0.631 0.622 {0.009
2150 0.745 0.730 0.716 0.703 0.630 0.617 {0.007
24Table 6.c. Assets: Base run without complications
Decades asset(2) asset(3) asset(4) asset(5) asset(6) Total assets
t a2;t=wL;t a3;t=wL;t a4;t=wL;t a5;t=wL;t a6;t=wL;t At=wL;t
1930 {0.087 {0.096 {0.052 0.017 0 {0.049
1940 {0.087 {0.096 {0.052 0.017 0 {0.049
1950 {0.087 {0.096 {0.052 0.017 0 {0.049
1960 {0.088 {0.097 {0.052 0.017 0 {0.049
1970 {0.043 {0.099 {0.052 0.017 0 {0.039
1980 0.008 {0.001 {0.058 0.019 0 {0.007
1990 0.059 0.108 0.102 0.010 0.007 0.064
2000 {0.087 0.005 0.051 0.008 0 {0.003
2010 {0.107 {0.114 {0.014 0 {0.003 {0.049
2020 {0.123 {0.142 {0.089 {0.010 {0.007 {0.079
2030 {0.124 {0.160 {0.112 {0.021 {0.011 {0.092
2040 {0.106 {0.146 {0.115 {0.023 {0.016 {0.088
2050 {0.093 {0.120 {0.098 {0.024 {0.018 {0.077
2060 {0.093 {0.110 {0.082 {0.024 {0.019 {0.071
2070 {0.097 {0.114 {0.080 {0.023 {0.018 {0.072
2080 {0.100 {0.119 {0.083 {0.022 {0.018 {0.074
2090 {0.102 {0.123 {0.086 {0.022 {0.018 {0.076
2100 {0.103 {0.125 {0.090 {0.022 {0.017 {0.078
2150 {0.100 {0.121 {0.086 {0.023 {0.018 {0.075
While working on this paper, I have continuously exchanged ideas with Heikki Oksa-
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